学术讲座：公司债券市场中的信任：来自法律诉讼的证据

摘要：本文采用法律诉讼作为公司可信度的外部冲击，分析法律、市场力量和社会资本如何影响发行者的公共债务的特征。相比于倾向性匹配类似的发行者，陷入诉讼的发行者所发行的投资级债券有更高的收益（4.9%），更短的期限（11个月），和更小的发行规模（1470亿美元）。当发行者是被告或者败诉，或当发行者的关系圈更紧密时，或当发行者总位于在存在高度信任的区域，这种约束效应会更强；而发行者的政治资本和承销方的市场力量会弱化这种效应。事件研究显示在诉讼宣布周围有显著为负的债券异常回报和过度交易。总的来说，本文揭示了信任如何塑造贷款合约的基础，和公共债权人在约束经理方面的正面影响。
Abstract: Using lawsuits as shock to firms’ trustworthiness, this paper examines how laws, market forces, and social capital affect issuers’ public debt properties. All else equal, investment grade bonds of litigated issuers have 4.9% higher yield spread, 11-month shorter maturity, and $14.7 million less issuance volume than propensity score matched bonds of non-litigated issuers. The tightening effect is more pronounced when issuers were defendants or lost the case, when issuers’ relationship circle is close-knit, or headquartered in high trust regions, and moderated by issuers’ political capital and the market power of their underwriters. Event study reports significantly negative abnormal bond return and excess trading volume around lawsuit announcements. Taken together, this paper uncovers the building blocks of trust in shaping loan contracts, and the positive role of public debt holders in constraining managers.